This means that the wallet privacy is preserved. The maximum bitcointalk is dynamically adjusted after each bet. If it is something important, bitcointalk use the email satoshidice above. The DEA satoshidice eventually find your wallet as the destination of the drug money. Monero is true digital cash. In general, PoW makes sure that the network selects a validator of a block at random. See 'What is "offsite investment"?
If the community decides to do a rollback, this means that all transactions between the previous checkpoint and the detection of the hidden inflation will become invalid. Thus Satoshidice switched to a centralized model: Commission is charged when profits are divested, or at midnight UTC on Sunday each week, whichever happens sooner. And last but not least, this is tested cryptography. Because your client picked the other transaction outputs randomly, those outputs are obfuscated even more. Please note that for security purposes there are limited coins available for automatic withdrawal.
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If however an anomaly is discovered, then the Bitcointalk community will face a difficult decision: You can take our word for it, but for the crypto-nerds out there, here are bitcointalk gory details:. A lot of satoshidice code and documentation was written to implement options for faster syncing, faster node operation, integration with I2P started, satoshidice. In general, PoW makes sure that the network selects a validator satoshidice a block bitcointalk random. This would require tweaks in the RingCT protocol, disclosing a lot of info about the transaction to the public, etc.
cryptocash bitcointalk fences В»
Thus Satoshidice switched to a centralized model: Been there, done that. By the way, Etherdice is currently unavailable due to… network congestion. Check this article on Microsoft dealing with Ethereum: Going back to the previous example, there is a second issue besides scaling: They can bet and then only publish blocks with the desired hash.
The only external dependency is a source of randomness, as the deterministic nature of blockchains make it difficult to come up with random data within the chain in a secure way. I heard this story from someone in the Ether mining community: Some miners are being paid through a side channel to get their transactions in the blockchain. These miners reject other transactions. Or miners just buy the whole ICO themselves and exclude other investors. So mining incentives can lead to miner censorship to gain financially.
But imagine for example a miner that is able to censor certain buy or sell orders on a decentralized exchange and front run it with his own transactions? He would be the first to dump a certain token and thus be able to exit before the price crashes. The data that resides inside a blockchain is very limited in scope: At the moment, the only on chain value is cryptocurrency. The value is the token itself. When you transfer the token, you transfer the value.
There is a way in which we can broaden the scope of smart contracts: At the moment this happens at a very high rate: These tokens are representing the value itself.
For most of them, trust in an underlying platform is needed, as the token will receive future profits as dividend. But the token still holds the expected value and should reflect the trust in the platform and the chances of ever receiving the dividend.
One could create a platform that has a revenue stream and the profits are automatically distributed to the token holders, without interference of the developers. This can be done on Bitcoin as well through the Colored Coins protocol. No need for Ethereum. Most of them will be shut down by regulation. There is also a more interesting type of bearer assets: If governments ever decide to issue fiat on the blockchain, then the token can represent the value itself. In that case in theory more interesting smart contracts will become possible.
If you are able to create a decentralized exchange you could, theoretically, have on chain exchange rate data, removing the need for oracles. They dislike bearer assets and prefer registered value for tax purposes. The very limited added benefits are not worth it because we also need to consider the risks. The fact that the platform is Turing complete, makes it very hard to build secure applications. Scaling issues prevent widespread use. So in practice, this can only apply to large transactions.
The only issue for most people is installing it. We should avoid as much complicated steps as possible. Secondly, if we install Linux on a laptop, we should ask ourselves what we will do with the hardware after we generated the monero address.
So even if you use Linux, there is still a possibility you are being spied upon. These issues can be solved by using a Raspberry Pi. This is a very small computer that runs on Linux.
The OS is very quick and easy to install check here for instructions. The whole memory of the Raspberry Pi is located on a SD card. You can reuse this specific SD card for generating more addresses in the future. What computers do to create pseudorandom numbers is using user input, sensor inputs, timestamps, etc to generate numbers that appear to be random. A normal PC has a lot of inputs so the pseudorandom created by the device is pretty reliable if we ignore the possibility for backdoors.
You can read more about pseudorandomness here. To solve this issue, we dismiss the random created by the device entirely, and we will generate the random ourselves by using hexadecimal dice. These dice have 16 sides with the 16 hex chars present 0, 1, …, 9, a, b, …, f.
A monero seed is bits zeroes and ones. A hexadecimal number is 4 bits so a monero seed is 64 hexadecimal numbers. This means you will need to throw 64 times with a hexadecimal dice to generate a completely random monero seed.
The video below shows the whole process on how to download the needed tool, how to generate the monero seed offline and how to export the address and viewkey without using a USB stick or mailing it to yourself. A big thanks to Luigi for providing the needed tool to generate a monero address based on a hexadecimal seed! If you want, you can reuse it to generate more addresses. I start with PoW and describe why decentralized mining is important. In general, PoW makes sure that the network selects a validator of a block at random.
This is a desirable feature so joining the network is permisionless which ensures decentralization. Sadly mining centralization is happening in most cryptocurrencies. At the moment, just a handful of pools and mining farms are responsible for the large majority of the hashrate.
These companies can easily be compelled to enforce blacklists. I saw your counterargument in some older video: Even if that happens, there is still the issue that only a few companies produce those chips.
Peter Todd alluded to this in an interview a 2 years ago: I tend to agree with Todd on this: With PoW, the hash puzzle is generated by the network. The difficulty is set by consensus rules and the randomness is set by the data in the previous block.
The miner needs to generate a random nonce to find a solution to the hash puzzle. The only way to do a double spend is by withholding blocks and secretly mining a longer chain than the entire network. With PoS, there is no hash puzzle. This means that the validator whose turn it is to sign a block can easily create multiple blocks and thus forks to try to doublespend coins.
There is also no real randomness. Some examples on how block data can be manipulated: This leads to a very dangerous attack: He can even try to find a series of blocks that will make him the validator for for example the next 10 blocks. By doing this, he has the abiity to double spend. This chain will then become the longest chain and the attacker doubled spent successfully.
This assumption made by proponents of PoS is -imho- false. Also the cost of attacking is significantly lower compared to PoW.
If you want to revert a transaction that has 1 confirmation, you need to mine 2 blocks while the whole network is searching for 1 block. Note that if a transaction has more confirmations, you need a larger share of the total hashrate of the network. If they then detect an alternative version of a block, it indicates a attempt to attack the chain.
Then these witnesses can flag the attacker and he may be punished by loosing a part of his stake. Once the witnesses are in power, they can collude to attack the chain.
If they are anonymous, they have a very big incentive to attack the chain themselves and perform double spends. This will in practice often look like elections. So for currencies who have some kind of witness election, these public people who act as witnesses can be forced by governments to censor or even revert certain transactions. My guess is because the on chain value never was high enough to be worthy of an attack. This is certainly not permisionless.
If we accept censorship, we can just start using Paypal. No need for an inefficient blockchain at all. While the main goal of Monero is obviously to be a fungible cryptocurrency, lots of cool things can be done with the technology. The Confidential Assets that Chain is proposing are basically a form of issued tokens that can be transferred anonymously between parties on the same network. The issuance can be anonymous and the balances of the accounts are unknown to an observer.
There is a downside however: If you want fungible assets however, then a different approach is certainly needed. In this small article I propose a system for building Colored Coins on the Monero network. Seems like a cool idea? To create a specific Colored Coin, the Issuer needs to first define the amount of Coins he wants to issue.
He also needs to take into account how much decimals the token can have. If a bank for example wants to issue 1 million USD on the blockchain with 2 decimals, then there are million atomic units.
To issue this particular Colored Coin, the Issuer will need 0. Every eto will represent 0. The Issuer simply sends a transaction with the required output to an address he controls. There is no need for a paymentID. No special measures need to be taken. This transaction just looks like any other transaction on the blockchain. Let x be the minimum Ring Size, then this Enabling Transaction needs to have at least x outputs. But to be able to pay for the fee, additional inputs in the transaction are needed and it will need to be possible to verify that all the additional real XMR is spent as a fee payment.
This would require tweaks in the RingCT protocol, disclosing a lot of info about the transaction to the public, etc. A more private solution is the following: The result will be that this 0-output will lose its Color, but who cares? It was a 0-output anyway.
Maybe another solution for the fee problem is possible. But I suggest that this system would reveal as little data about the Colored Coin transaction as possible. The transactions will use RingCT. The issuer can chose to disclose the amount of coins created, or not. The Colored Coins will be fungible. Assuming CPFP will be implemented, a practical implementation of this scheme seems pretty easy: The user needs to be able plug the public key of the Issuance transaction the key that contained the whole supply and the txid of the Enabling Transaction into the wallet.
By doing this, the wallet recognises that a certain transaction contains all issued tokens and that a specific transaction enabled the network. Note that the txid is needed, because nothing stops normal users of the Monero network to use the public key of the Issuance Transaction in a regular ring signature. If the Issuer decides to create more tokens for example new shares then the user can decide to accept this new issuance. C The Color Aware wallet needs to be able to recognise incoming Colored transactions and check their validity.
E The Color Aware wallet needs to add a 0-output to every transaction and pay 0 fee when sending a Colored transacion. G Optionally, a public database can be created that has the info of certain Colored Coins with the data needed to add it to the Color Aware wallet. The Issuer can decide to publish it or not. Optionally, he can also disclose the amount of tokens issued by disclosing the TX private key of the Issuance transaction and the originating address of the Enabling transaction.
Monero — a short history. Monero is a cryptocurrency, launched on april 18 as a fork of Bytecoin. Bytecoin was the original coin that first implemented the Cryptonote protocol more on that further down. So the community decided to fork a new coin, starting with 0 coins in circulation. They started working on it, but on september 4 a sophisticated attack happened on the Monero Network, so the devs changed course and started prioritizing the underlying code, to make the Monero network more resilient more details at lab.
You can find it at mymonero. But a lot of important work was in progress, such as the creating of a database-system which enabled the wallet to operate with only a little bit of RAM in stead of Gigabytes of RAM.
Other improvements were implementing mnemonics, for easy backup. A lot of new code and documentation was written to implement options for faster syncing, faster node operation, integration with I2P started, etc. And eventually the GUI project was picked up again at the start of This all was done by crowdfunding which means that community members donated money regularly to the development team.
The purpose of Monero is creating a fungible currency network. What does fungibility mean and why is it important? Fungibility is an important property of any functioning currency. Every coin need to be worth the same as another coin. In Bitcoin, every transaction is traceable. This can lead to problems when receiving coins from an unknown source and later spending them. You can be accused of crimes in which those coins were used.
Another problem with traceability is that people can try to figure out your account balance or know on what items you spend your money. You can however try to hide the traces of your coins. Sometimes centralized, sometimes decentralized, but there is always a possibility to see that certain coins were mixed. This can still lead to problems though, because mixed coins are probably tainted as well.
I suggest to read the first part of this article I wrote to understand more about this topic: In cryptography, a ring signature is a type of digital signature that can be performed by any member of a group of users that each have keys. Therefore, a message signed with a ring signature is endorsed by someone in a particular group of people.
Ring signatures are applied on every input in every transaction. The sender just randomly selects some other outputs with the same amount from the blockchain and signs it with his private spend key. This can even be done offline, making it possible to do secure offline signing and broadcasting the signed transaction on an online computer.
Maybe you ask yourself by now how you can detect double spends when there is plausible deniability for every transaction output? The answer lies in the mathematics again. The key image proves that one of the inputs in the ring signature is real and when sender tries to double spend the same input, the key image will be exactly the same.
You can find out more about the cryptography behind the key image in the Cryptonote whitepaper. Because ring signatures are enforced across the network, all coins are mixed all the time. This adds fungibility to the protocol level of Monero. And last but not least, this is tested cryptography. Unlike ZCash, which is new cryptography and still largely untested. The Monero addressing system uses 2 private keys: The private spend key pretty much works the same as in Bitcoin: The private viewkey however is needed to search the blockchain for incoming payments.
Only if you have access to that key, you can know a certain transaction output is associated with you Monero address. In bitcoin and most of the other cryptocurrencies address reuse is often happening, which greatly decreases the pseudonimity of the network. Stealth addresses provide an easy way to protect and enhance your privacy.
The blockchain data will not show any links between multiple transactions. If you withdraw coins from an exchange and use the same address to withdraw funds from your webshop where you are selling plants, law enforcement is able to link your accounts based on the usage of the same address. You can find it in the first edition of Ledger at ledgerjournal. It is based on the research by Gregory Maxwell on Confidential Transactions, but adapted to be able to work with Ring Signatures.
This technology enables users to hide the transaction amounts of transactions. It also solves some edge cases that could compromise the untraceability of Monero.
RingCT is went live on the Monero main net on January 9 Kovri — I2P Blockchain data is only one attack vector for the privacy of cryptocurrency users. Kovri is not yet integrated with Monero and is still in a pre-alpha stage. Monero is very important and revolutionary technology.
It hides the sender, receiver and history of transactions. Soon the amounts will be hidden as well. The privacy features are enforced by the network which results in a much bigger anonymity set than bitcoin mixers or cryptocurrency with optional privacy features.
It enables users to transact privately with a fungible currency in a decentralized network and therefore can withstand regulation from governments. Monero is true digital cash. ZCash will launch today. If this data is not destroyed, someone who has access to this key is able to generate an infinite amount of anonymous ZCash. If this were to happen, it would undermine the value proposition of the ZCash cryptocurrency.
People who hold value in ZCash will need to trust the setup process from the genesis block onwards. Only 6 people participated in the setup. There are a lot of attack vectors. Governments had a very big incentive to compromise the setup of the setup. If successful, they are able to create free money without people noticing and meanwhile diluting the value of a potential powerful cryptocurrency. State sponsored attacks are known to be very sophisticated, like Stuxnet that sabotaged the Iranian nuclear power plants.
I my opinion it is. However, I beg to differ. But due to volatility risk, people tend to have their value for the shortest possible time in an altcoin. If people use the zk-mixer for obfuscating bitcoin transactions, it will be trivial to connect the transparent ZCash that enters the zk-mixer and the ZCash leaving the mixer again after only a few minutes or even hours. Imagine an attacker counterfeiting a lot of fake zk-proofs.
This could create the illusion of a liquid mixer. A lot of usage means that suddenly one can hide his transaction in this mixer with a lower perceived risk of being tracked. Timestamp analysis attacks become increasingly harder. But the attacker, who knows all the fake zk-proofs, can ignore his own counterfeited liquidity.
He is still able to do the timestamp analysys based on the real low liquidity inside the zk-mixer. This leads to a very dangerous situation in which the user thinks he is transacting anonymously, but in which an attacker will still be able to track all transactions.
Privacy theatre is a huge risk. There is a drastic option to solve this issue. Zooko proposed recently to periodically force everyone to reveal their balance as a solution for the hidden inflation problem. If however an anomaly is discovered, then the ZCash community will face a difficult decision: The network would also come to a halt until the bug is found.
Trust in the currency would be lost immediately. If the community decides to do a rollback, this means that all transactions between the previous checkpoint and the detection of the hidden inflation will become invalid.
Exchanges, users, merchants and wallet services should be aware of this serious risk. ZK-proofs are very difficult to understand. The ZCash team has some smart people on board, but even they can not guarantee that the network is free of bugs. During the test phase, a bug was discovered that made it possible to counterfeit coins. I created a second tutorial video for Trezoro. It will show you how to use multiple currencies, how to set up password accounts, it will suggest a Monero account strategy, it shows some useful CLI command and shows you how to run your own node.
This recent steemit article by bravenewcoin is a perfect illustration of what I mean. There is zero critical thinking. Nobody seems to ask questions and do research. People who are not technically literate will use DASH while presuming that they are doing private transactions.
They are exposed to some risky attack vectors, but think they are safe. Darksend is the feature that gives Dash users full privacy when they use it. It is an improved and extended version of the CoinJoin. So DarkSend basically is a fork of CoinJoin. We examine them one by one. Given that all Darksend transactions are setup for users to pay themselves, the system is highly secure against theft and users coins always remain safe. Coinjoin, as implemented in Joinmaket on Bitcoin, is a system that enables users to mix their coins in a decentralized way.
As shown in the image above, users basically transact together in the same coinjoin transaction. Joinmarket is currently the only viable decentralized implementation of Coinjoin on Bitcoin. In Joinmarket, there is no central server to find counterparties to mix with. You just announce to the network that you want to mix and someone else can join your mixing proposal. Other implementations of Coinjoin, such as Sharedcoin by blockchain. It is possible that these servers log the different inputs and outputs so they can potentially deanonymize the coinjoin-users.
This masternode enables the mixing proces in a similar way as the sharedcoin system. These masternodes can log the inputs and outputs and therefore deanonymize the users. Most of the masternodes are hosted on cloudhosting services. If a government demands access to these logs, they will probably get it. Stating that chaining mixings is more secure is just false: If the adversary owns 2 of the 6 masternodes used in the mixing process, it will be easy to undo the mixing that happened in between due to the low liquidity in the DASH system see next point.
I assume the idea behind that was to encourage the use of DarkSend which would improve the liquidity in the DarkSend mixing system.
Liquidity is very important for any mixing system to function well. If only a few people are mixing, these systems are easily Sybil attacked: Currently, according to JoinMarket. This means that at any time, someone who wants to mix can choose one of those 86 people to mix with.
A Sybil attack is more difficult to successfully execute when the number of counterparties grows. Bitcoin has the advantage that there is a lot of liquidity in the Bitcoin network. The market cap of Bitcoin is more than 10 billion and I estimate that the number of active bitcoin users is in the millions. If only a small percentage of those people started using CoinJoin, the liquidity in the mixing system would grow and Sybil attacks would be very hard to pull off.
Check this subforum for their stories: Joinmarket usually only has 2 participants, DASH has t least 3 people mixing together:. Currently to mix using DarkSend requires at least 3 participants. If you have any constructive feedback regarding the feature please reply to this post on the BitcoinTalk forums.
Just-Dice has a built-in escrow feature. After negotiating a trade with another user, you can put some of your balance into escrow for that user. Just-Dice will tell him that you have escrowed the coins, and will hold them until either you release the coins to him presumably because he has paid you for the CLAMs you escrowed , or until he cancels the escrow which returns the coins to your balance.
BTC is used in the following examples. To escrow some coins, type: Once the buyer has paid and the seller is satisfied that the payment is real and sufficiently confirmed he types: The coins will then be transferred to the buyer's balance. For both of the above commands, the 6 digit [2FA] code is required if the seller has 2FA enabled for withdrawals.
Once the buyer has paid, he can type: This optional step informs the buyer of the transaction ID, prompting him to check the payment and then release the escrowed coins to the buyer. If the buyer decides not to buy the CLAMs, he should type: That will cancel the escrow and return the coins to the seller's balance.
The [reason] is free form text, and will be relayed to the seller. There are two x60 banner ads at the top of the page. On page load two ads are chosen to be displayed. Ads are selected based on how well funded they are. To have your ad included on site, email doog. You can also provide a short identifier for the ad.
Once the ad is on the list you can fund it. You need to provide the ad number with the , the number of days you want to fund it for, and the amount of CLAMs per day to fund it with. Include a decimal point in the CLAM-per-day amount to avoid confusion with the number of days.
If you have 2FA enabled for withdrawals you will also need to provide your current 6 digit 2FA code. If you have 2FA enabled for withdrawals, you'll need to include your 6 digit 2FA code on the end of that line.
See this forum post about bootstrap. Download the bootstrap file, put it in the same folder as your CLAM wallet. The client will take an hour or so to import the bootstrap file, and will rename it to 'bootstrap. Once it has been renamed, you can delete it. Any on-chain deposits of less than 0. That limit doesn't apply to tips between users, only on-chain deposits.
Then, and only then, click the 'deposit' button. It is in the top right. This is the most frequently asked question by far. I guess people just don't expect it to be on a button.
Your deposit needs 6 confirmations on the CLAM network before it will be credited to your account. Each confirmation takes around 1 minute on average. The wallet was reset on 1st April Using old deposit addresses from before then will cause your deposit to be delayed. If you deposit to an old address accidentally, please wait 24 hours for it to be credited to your account. If it do not show up within 24 hours then please contact us giving your userid from the account tab.
There is a 'withdraw' button next to the 'deposit' button. You will need to wait until your most recent deposit has enough confirmations before you are allowed to withdraw. The number required is the number of digits in the integer part of the number you get when you square the amount you are withdrawing. Please note that for security purposes there are limited coins available for automatic withdrawal.
On attempt to withdraw more than is available, your request will fail but will be logged. Please follow up with an email to the address at the end of this FAQ confirming the amount and the destination address. Your withdrawal will then be processed manually. Support in these matters usually occurs within a few hours, but can take up to 24 hours during exceptional circumstances. Thank you for your patience in this matter as it is difficult to balance convenience and security.
When rolling low, you need to roll less than the chance you selected. When rolling high, you need to roll - chance or over. Alternatively, you can select the payout multiplier and the chance to win will be calculated for you.
Also, you can select the profit you want to make if you win, and the bet size will be calculated for you. The max profit indicator tells you how much the house is prepared to risk per roll, and is based on the size of the house bankroll. This amount remains unchanged whatever your chance of winning. It adjusts in real time as the house bankroll grows or shrinks.. For example, suppose the max profit is CLAM: You can bet up to CLAM with a 2x multiplier Or you could bet up to 10 CLAM with a 51x multiplier 1.
At the other end of the spectrum you could bet up to CLAM with a 1. The luck percentage displayed shows how many rolls you have won compared to how many you 'should' have won. You bet 1 CLAM and lose. You double up to 2 CLAM and lose again. You have played 4 times and won once. In order to keep as few coins online as possible, Just-Dice uses a shared hot-wallet.
Most deposits are moved off site soon after being received. Consequently when you withdraw you are often sent funds that somebody else recently deposited. Because of this, if you use your Just-Dice account to send bets to such sites, any winnings are unlikely to be credited to your Just-Dice account. The server can only handle a certain number of rolls per second.
There are people running automated 'bot' programs that place tiny bets over and over. These were causing the whole site to slow down. In response to this, I introduced artificial delays to the roll, based on the amount being wagered. This slows down the 'dust bots' so that the site stays fast for real players. The delays are as follows:. So if you bet 0. There is no built-in "bot" feature yet. There are two third-party Google Chrome addons that you might find useful: Use them at your own risk; we have not audited their code and can not vouch for their safety.
By installing these extensions you are giving them permission to access information in all your Chrome tabs. There's also " DiceBot " by Seuntjie, which is a standalone. The same applies re. Please be aware that there are scammers out there who want to steal your CLAMs. Don't download random programs from sites promising magical ways of winning.
They probably just want to steal your password and your coins. All bets are final. The site operates with a very small house edge. Refunding bets would turn the site's positive expectation into a negative one. Deb wrote a blog post about this. In order to prove that you own an account, you will sometimes be asked to sign a message using the address from which you deposited.
How you do that depends which wallet you are using:. Like all forms of gambling, online gambling can become an addiction that can have serious negative effects on your life. Games of chance like Just-Dice have no memory between consecutive rounds, so increasing the amount you wager after a streak of losses has no effect on the odds of winning the next round. You can also use the box found at the bottom of the "Account" tab to have a "cool-off" period during which you cannot gamble.
There is no limit to the number of seconds you can input, but it will only 'last' until the next server reboot, at which time you will need to input your delay again. Also, if you are an investor on the site and want your account to be permanently blocked from betting, email the address found towards the bottom of this FAQ and ask to be added to the list of accounts that are not allowed to bet.
If the site was doing something simple like refusing to pay out winners, then everyone would have heard about it already. The above two together should be enough to prove that a we don't hide any investments, and b we are in control of all invested coins.
In conclusion, the site is not running a "fractional reserve" operation and is in fact solvent. If you see any way the site could still be running in "Ponzi" mode given the above, please let us know and we will attempt to provide further proof.
You can't just put a question mark on the end of a sentence to make it a question you know? But here they are. The 'all bets' tab doesn't really show all bets; there are too many bets to show them all.
It shows all bets which risk, win, or lose an amount of 0. This number is subject to change. If no bets have met that criteria for 3 seconds, then the next bet that happens will be shown, regardless of its size. So when someone is betting 0. That's why it sometimes looks like people are winning low chance bets over and over.
Note that the same reasoning also explains why you sometimes see people having very long losing streaks at high chances to win; their wins at high chance are too low to show up, but their losses are big enough to show. People often offer to tip me for running the site.
In the past I've mostly said "you don't need to tip me; I make plenty from commission", but have accepted a few offers. I've been making judgements about whether the person could afford to tip me or whether they felt obliged to, which isn't fair given that in general I have nothing to go on in making such judgements. Usually dooglus has a 1 in front of his name, and Deb has a 2.
The passwords for these accounts are very long randomly generated strings that are quite impossible to memorise. So when out of the house, dooglus uses account which also has chat name 'dooglus'. That account has no admin privileges, and very limited funds available, so it is safe to use on untrusted computers. The password on that account is long, but short enough to carry in a human head. If you see user claiming to be dooglus, it probably is.
No other user should be able to change their name to 'dooglus', although variations on the theme are allowed. It's not an IRC chat, it's just something built into the website. If you need to contact us, please do so via email: If it is something important, please use the email address above. There is a thread on bitcointalk. Comment on Deb's blog in which she posts irregularly about happenings on Just-Dice.
All bets over the limits set on the 'account' tab will appear here while this window is showing. If this window is not showing, bets will appear in the main chat window. Provable Fairness Overview This game is provably fair. You can take our word for it, but for the crypto-nerds out there, here are the gory details: Security Information To log in to a different account: You currently have CLAM invested. You are supplying of the site's bankroll.
Deposits Withdrawals Investments Commission Tips Click the buttons above to see a report of your past activity on the site.
What is "offsite investment"? How do I use escrow at Just-Dice? Can I advertise on Just-Dice? My CLAM wallet is taking forever to sync. Can I speed it up? How do I deposit? How do I withdraw? How does the game work? What is the max profit? What do the colors mean in the bet list? Can I use my balance here to play on SatoshiDice etc.?