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There is no well-defined profile, and attacks are data rare. Certainly, there are cryptogram warning signs that many terrorist mining share, but each is unique, as well. Users should upgrade immediately. In the Netherlands, criminals are stealing information from ATM machines by blowing them up. Transmitted to the card in Issuer Authentication Data. Something 9f27 50 million pounds was stolen from a banknote storage depot in the UK.

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To reduce both those numbers, you need a well-defined profile. A "life recorder" you can wear on your lapel that constantly records is still a few generations off: This is a format 2 response message to the Generate AC command. The credit card industry has dealt with the risk in two ways: This is a complicated web of proxies, but it's a complicated system. But these are all instances where the cost of false positives is low -- a phone call from a Visa operator, or an uninteresting ad -- and in systems that have value even if there is a high number of false negatives. The more our government is based on secrecy, the more we are forced to "just trust" it and the less we actually trust it.

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Clever idea, but difficult to implement. Information people think mining surveillance in terms of police procedure: This bug is fixed in Version 1. There are trillions of connections between people and events -- things 9f27 the data mining system will have to "look cryptogram -- and very few plots. The Security Risks data Centralization:

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This isn't anything new. In statistics, it's called the "base rate fallacy" and it applies in other domains as well.

For example, even highly accurate medical tests are useless as diagnostic tools if the incidence of the disease is rare in the general population.

Terrorist attacks are also rare, any "test" is going to result in an endless stream of false alarms. This is exactly the sort of thing we saw with the NSA's eavesdropping program: Every one of them turned out to be a false alarm. And the cost was enormous: The fundamental freedoms that make our country the envy of the world are valuable, and not something that we should throw away lightly.

Data mining can work. It helps Visa keep the costs of fraud down, just as it helps Amazon. But these are all instances where the cost of false positives is low -- a phone call from a Visa operator, or an uninteresting ad -- and in systems that have value even if there is a high number of false negatives.

Finding terrorism plots is not a problem that lends itself to data mining. It's a needle-in-a-haystack problem, and throwing more hay on the pile doesn't make that problem any easier. We'd be far better off putting people in charge of investigating potential plots and letting them direct the computers, instead of putting the computers in charge and letting them decide who should be investigated.

This essay originally appeared on Wired. At LaGuardia, a man successfully walked through the metal detector, but screeners wanted to check his shoes. Some reports say his shoes set off an alarm.

But he didn't wait, and disappeared into the crowd. The entire Delta Airlines terminal had to be evacuated, and between 2, and 3, people had to be rescreened.

I'm sure the resultant flight delays rippled through the entire system. Security systems can fail in two ways. They can fail to defend against an attack. And they can fail when there is no attack to defend. The latter failure is often more important, because false alarms are more common than real attacks. Aside from the obvious security failure -- how did this person manage to disappear into the crowd, anyway -- it's painfully obvious that the overall security system did not fail well.

Well-designed security systems fail gracefully, without affecting the entire airport terminal. That the only thing the TSA could do after the failure was evacuate the entire terminal and rescreen everyone is a testament to how badly designed the security system is.

Alex Halderman and Edward W. This is a great example of a movie-plot threat: A court has ruled that companies do not have to encrypt data under Gramm-Leach Bliley. I know nothing of the legal merits of the case, nor do I have an opinion about whether Gramm-Leach-Bliley does or does not require financial companies to encrypt personal data in its purview. But I do know that we as a society need to force companies to encrypt personal data about us.

Companies won't do it on their own -- the market just doesn't encourage this behavior -- so legislation or liability are the only available mechanisms. If this law doesn't do it, we need another one. I find this phishing attack impressive for several reasons. One, it's a very sophisticated attack and demonstrates how clever identity thieves are becoming. Two, it narrowly targets a particular credit union, and sneakily uses the fact that credit cards issued by an institution share the same initial digits.

Three, it exploits an authentication problem with SSL certificates. And four, it is yet another proof point that "user education" isn't how we're going to solve this kind of risk. Patrick Smith, a former pilot, writes about his experiences -- involving the police -- taking pictures in airports. More on port security funny: The Houston chief of police wants to put surveillance cameras in apartment complexes, downtown streets, shopping malls and even private homes to fight crime during a shortage of police officers.

I asked for suggestions on my blog, and there were some really good responses. Something like 50 million pounds was stolen from a banknote storage depot in the UK.

Today, the weak points in the banks' defences are not grilles and vaults, but human beings. Stealing money is now partly a matter of psychology. The success of the Tonbridge robbers depended on terrifying Mr Dixon into opening the doors. They had studied their victim. They knew the route he took home, and how he would respond when his wife and child were in mortal danger.

It did not take gelignite to blow open the vaults; it took fear, in the hostage technique known as 'tiger kidnapping,' so called because of the predatory stalking that precedes it. Tiger kidnapping is the point where old-fashioned crime meets modern terrorism. DNA surveillance in the UK: Quantum computing just got more bizarre: So now, even turning the machine off won't necessarily prevent hackers from stealing passwords.

Last month I wrote about a wiretapping scandal in Greece. More details are emerging. It turns out that the "malicious code" was actually code designed into the system. It's eavesdropping code put into the system for the police. The attackers managed to bypass the authorization mechanisms of the eavesdropping system, and activate the "lawful interception" module in the mobile network.

They then redirected about numbers to 14 shadow numbers they controlled. There is an important security lesson here. I have long argued that when you build surveillance mechanisms into communication systems, you invite the bad guys to use those mechanisms for their own purposes.

That's exactly what happened here. Jury duty identity-theft scam: There's nothing particularly amazing about the hack; the most remarkable thing is how badly the system was designed in the first place. The only security on the cards is a three-byte code that lets you read and write to the card. I'd be amazed if no one has hacked this before. Nothing too surprising in this study of password generation practices: This story shows how badly terrorist profiling can go wrong: The article goes on to blame something called the Bank Privacy Act, but that's not correct.

Remember, all the time spent chasing down silly false alarms is time wasted. Finding terrorist plots is a signal-to-noise problem, and stuff like this substantially decreases that ratio: It makes us less safe, because it makes terrorist plots harder to find.

I haven't waded through all the details, but here are a bunch of links: Using social engineering to crash the Oscars: Fighting misuse of the Patriot Act: Essay on the "analog hole," the human dimension of the problem of securing information. Along the same lines, here's a story about the security risks of talking loudly: Criminals are breaking into stores and pretending to ransack them, as a cover for installing ATM skimming hardware, complete with a transmitter.

Note the last paragraph of the story -- it's in Danish, sorry -- where the company admits that this is the fourth attempt they know of criminals installing reader equipment inside ATM terminals for the purpose of skimming numbers and PINs.

The Identity Project wants you to try it out. If you have time, try to fly without showing ID. I know you can do this if you claim that you lost your ID, but I don't know what the results would be if you simply refuse to show ID.

In the Netherlands, criminals are stealing money from ATM machines by blowing them up. First, they drill a hole in an ATM and fill it with some sort of gas. Then, they ignite the gas -- from a safe distance -- and clean up the money that flies all over the place after the ATM explodes. Sounds crazy, but apparently there has been an increase in this type of attack recently. The banks' countermeasure is to install air vents so that gas can't build up inside the ATMs.

Recently, a very serious vulnerability was discovered in the software: This bug is fixed in Version 1. Users should upgrade immediately.

It appears this bug has existed for years without anybody finding it. Open source does not necessarily mean "fewer bugs. Finding covert CIA agents using the Internet: An article explains how you can modify, and then print, your own boarding pass and get on an airplane even if you're on the no-fly list. This isn't news; I wrote about it in Interesting, but long, article on bioterrorism: Clever college basketball prank relies on social engineering: Yosef Maiwandi formed the San Gabriel Valley Transit Authority -- a tiny, privately run nonprofit organization that provides bus rides to disabled people and senior citizens.

It operates out of an auto repair shop. Then, because the law seems to allow transit companies to form their own police departments, he formed the San Gabriel Valley Transit Authority Police Department. As a thank you, he made Stefan Eriksson a deputy police commissioner of the San Gabriel Transit Authority Police's anti-terrorism division, and gave him business cards.

Police departments like this don't have much legal authority, they don't really need to. My guess is that the name alone is impressive enough. In the computer security world, privilege escalation means using some legitimately granted authority to secure extra authority that was not intended.

This is a real-world counterpart. Even though transit police departments are meant to police their vehicles only, the title -- and the ostensible authority that comes along with it -- is useful elsewhere. Someone with criminal intent could easily use this authority to evade scrutiny or commit fraud. The police certification agency is seeking to decertify those agencies because it sees no reason for them to exist in California. The real problem is that we're too deferential to police power.

We don't know the limits of police authority, whether it be an airport policeman or someone with a business card from the "San Gabriel Valley Transit Authority Police Department. Seems that some unauthorized user accidentally changed the value of some database entry. One, the system did not fail safely. This one error seems to have cascaded into multiple errors, as the new tax total immediately changed budgets of "18 government taxing units.

Two, there were no sanity checks on the system. Three, the access-control mechanisms on the computer system were too broad. When a user is authenticated to use the "R-E-D" program, he shouldn't automatically have permission to use the "R-E-R" program as well.

Authentication isn't all or nothing; it should be granular to the operation. A guy tears up a credit card application, tapes it back together, fills it out with someone else's address and a different phone number, and send it in.

He still gets a credit card. Imagine that some fraudster is rummaging through your trash and finds a torn-up credit card application. That's why this is bad.

To understand why it's happening, you need to understand the trade-offs and the agenda. From the point of view of the credit card company, the benefits of giving someone a credit card is that he'll use it and generate revenue.

The risk is that it's a fraudster who will cost the company revenue. The credit card industry has dealt with the risk in two ways: All other costs and problems of identity theft are borne by the consumer; they're an externality to the credit card company. They don't enter into the trade-off decision at all. We can laugh at this kind of thing all day, but it's actually in the best interests of the credit card industry to mail cards in response to torn-up and taped-together applications without doing much checking of the address or phone number.

If we want that to change, we need to fix the externality. Counterpane and MessageLabs has released a joint Attack Trends report: TippingPoint partners with Counterpane: Schneier is speaking at the Rochester Institute of Technology on April 7th: There are other job openings, too.

Schneier received the Dr. Dobb's Journal Excellence in Programming Award: CNN interviewed Schneier for a story about cell phone tracking. Among those who were duped were employees of a major retail bank and two global insurers.

This was a benign stunt, but it could have been much more serious. A CD-ROM carried into the office and run on a computer bypasses the company's network security systems. You could easily imagine a criminal ring using this technique to deliver a malicious program into a corporate network -- and it would work. But concluding that employees don't care about security is a bit naive. Employees care about security; they just don't understand it. Computer and network security is complicated and confusing, and unless you're technologically inclined, you're just not going to have an intuitive feel for what's appropriate and what's a security risk.

Even worse, technology changes quickly, and any security intuition an employee has is likely to be out of date within a short time. Education is one way to deal with this, but education has its limitations. I'm sure these banks had security awareness campaigns; they just didn't stick. Punishment is another form of education, and my guess it would be more effective. If the banks fired everyone who fell for the CD-ROM-on-the-street trick, you can be sure that no one would ever do that again.

At least, until everyone forgot. That won't ever happen, though, because the morale effects would be huge. Rather than blaming this kind of behavior on the users, we would be better served by focusing on the technology. Why doesn't the computer block that action, or at least inform the IT department? Computers need to be secure regardless of who's sitting in front of them, irrespective of what they do.

If I go downstairs and try to repair the heating system in my home, I'm likely to break all sorts of safety rules -- and probably the system and myself in the process.

I have no experience in that sort of thing, and honestly, there's no point trying to educate me. But my home heating system works fine without my having to learn anything about it.

I know how to set my thermostat, and to call a professional if something goes wrong. Does it make sense to surrender management, including security, of six U. This question has set off a heated debate between the administration and Congress, as members of both parties condemned the deal.

Most of the rhetoric is political posturing, but there's an interesting security issue embedded in the controversy. It's about proxies, trust, and transparency. A proxy is a concept I discussed in my book "Beyond Fear.

It's how complex societies work -- it's impossible for us all to do everything or make every decision, so we cede some authority to proxies. Whether it's the cook at the restaurant where you're eating, the suppliers who make your business run or your government, proxies are everywhere.

Sometimes proxies act in our behalf simply because we can't do everything. But more often we have these proxies because we don't have the expertise to do the work ourselves. Most security works through proxies. We just don't have the expertise to make decisions about airline security, police coverage and military readiness, so we rely on others. We all hope our proxies make the same decisions we would have, but our only choice is to trust -- to rely on, really -- our proxies.

Even though we are forced to rely on them, we may or may not trust them. When we trust our proxies, we come to that trust in a variety of ways -- sometimes through experience, sometimes through recommendations from a source we trust.

Sometimes it's third-party audit, affiliations in professional societies or a gut feeling. But when it comes to government, trust is based on transparency.

The more our government is based on secrecy, the more we are forced to "just trust" it and the less we actually trust it. The security of U. We, the people, gave our proxy to our elected officials. This is a complicated web of proxies, but it's a complicated system. We have trouble trusting it, because so much is shrouded in secrecy. We don't know what kind of security these ports have. We hear snippets like "only 5 percent of incoming cargo is inspected," but we don't know more than that.

We don't know what kind of security there is in the UAE, Dubai Ports World or the subsidiary that is actually doing the work. We have no choice but to rely on these proxies, yet we have no basis by which to trust them. Pull aside the rhetoric, and this is everyone's point.

There are those who don't trust the Bush administration and believe its motivations are political. There are those who don't trust security at our nation's ports generally and see this as just another example of the problem. The solution is openness. Indicates the country of the issuer as defined in ISO using a 2 character alphabetic code.

Indicates the country of the issuer as defined in ISO using a 3 character alphabetic code. The number that identifies the major industry and the card issuer and that forms the first part of the Primary Account Number PAN. List in tag and length format of data objects representing the logged data elements that are passed to the terminal when a transaction log record is read.

Issuer-specified preference for the maximum number of consecutive offline transactions for this ICC application allowed in a terminal with online capability. Classifies the type of business being done by the merchant, represented according to ISO Contains issuer data for transmission to the card in the Issuer Authentication Data of an online transaction.

Contains the data objects without tags and lengths returned by the ICC in response to a command. List of tags of primitive data objects defined in this specification whose value fields are to be included in the Signed Static or Dynamic Application Data.

Indicates the environment of the terminal, its communications capability, and its operational control. Pad with one Hex 'F' if needed to ensure whole bytes b. List of data objects tag and length to be used by the terminal in generating the TC Hash Value.

Indicates the implied position of the decimal point from the right of the transaction amount represented according to ISO Code defining the common currency used by the terminal in case the Transaction Currency Code is different from the Application Currency Code. Indicates the implied position of the decimal point from the right of the transaction amount, with the Transaction Reference Currency Code represented according to ISO Indicates the type of financial transaction, represented by the first two digits of ISO